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I. Introduction
In 2000, President Clinton introduced the landmark Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information' (federal standards) with the words
"[n]othing is more private than someone's medical or psychiatric records. ' 2 It is well
known that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
3
committed the federal government to a process of "Administrative Simplification" to
reduce healthcare costs, but Congress wanted to limit how far the healthcare industry
could externalize attendant privacy risks to patients.4 Yet, in the aftermath, what should
have been a substantial victory for patient autonomy and informational privacy has
morphed into yet another divisive debate about professionalism and healthcare
regulation. State and federal privacy law may be omnipresent, the pages of medical
journals and law reviews may be filled with exhortations of confidentiality, and the
media, often diingenuously, may be quick to pounce on system failures, but health
information privacy is surprisingly fragile.
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1 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2009).
2 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by the President on
Medical Privacy (Dec. 20, 2000), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/news/whpress.html
(last visited Jan. 22, 2009).
3 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
4 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2) (2006) (instituting safeguards to protect patient information).
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Elsewhere, I have argued that the necessity of protecting the privacy of health
information is broadly, if not universally, accepted (at least in the ethical and legal
domains), yet counter-intuitively dogged by controversy.' Rather than an accepted social
imperative protected by a powerful triumvirate of ethical constraints, effective laws, and
operational necessities, I see a construct that lacks consistent terminology, a convincing
rationale, or general principles that can be effectively conveyed to patients and
providers.
This essay seeks to ideptify some of the reasons why "privacy" remains so
contentious. Here I suggest several possible answers ranging from "micro" issues such
as what we understand by health privacy, to more "macro" and operational issues
encountered as we seek to protect health information. First, lawyers have made
consistent errors in the terminology applied to the protection of medical privacy;
second, both the legal and ethical domains have failed to apply a consistent and robust
rationale for health privacy, leaving it prey to consequentialist thought and policy; third,
the declining importance of the physician-patient relationship as the touchstone for
obligations, particularly confidentiality, has created a "rights" vacuum; fourth, the health
information revolution truly is revolutionary in its reach and its concomitant threats to
privacy and confidentiality; and, finally, as privacy regulation increasingly lies in the
sphere of governmental command-control regulation, it has joined the list of targets in
the professionalism-market-regulation conflict over millennial healthcare delivery.
II. Errors in Terminology
Upon initial analysis, the legal and ethical domains display a degree of syn-
chronization regarding the protection of patient data. However, as discussed below,
their prevailing rationales either diverge or are used inconsistently. 6 As described in this
section, both domains commit errors in their terminology and their operational
approaches.
In the ethical domain Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress describe a
patient's right of privacy that is not limited to information about the person but extends
to "zones of intimacy, secrecy, anonymity, seclusion, or solitude."7 Similar observations
5 Nicolas P. Terry, Privay and the Health Information Domain: Properties, Models and Unintended Results,
10 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 223, 223 (2003) [hereinafter Health Information Domain] (identifying and
exploring three reasons for controversy surrounding protecting privacy of health information).
6 TOM L. BEAUCHAM.P &JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 410 (4th ed.,
1994).
7 Id. at 408. This is reflected in AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
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populate the legal domain. However, unpacking the legal notion of privacy yields a
picture that is both incoherent and incomplete, suggesting not only terminological flaws
but also a considerable disconnect between ethical and legal constructs, a disconnect
that seems heightened when we examine the protection of health information.
Legal and regulatory systems may potentially utilize three basic models for the
protection of personal information: deidentification, collection control, and disclosure
control. The first of these models assumes (more or less correctly) that data that is
deidentified prior to collection (or, somewhat less successfully, prior to disclosure)
reduces or eliminates personal risks associated with its use or processing.9 The second
potential protective model is to place limitations on data collection. Such a model could,
for example, prohibit all collection in certain circumstances (e.g., the harvesting of
genetic information by life insurers) or limit collection via a proportionality rule (e.g.,
only information necessary for the purposes of treatment). The third protective model,
again primarily focusing on informational privacy, is to place limitations on data
disclosure (e.g., hospital records may be disclosed to physicians but not drug
companies).
Oddly, our legal systems are only dimly cognizant of the deidentification model.
For example, while the federal standards are generally inapplicable to deidentified health
information,10 they do not require deidentification. 1 Even more surprisingly, the U.S.
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, PRIVACY IN THE CONTEXT OF HEALTH CARE (2001), http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_2i0 1.pdf (last visited jan. 18, 2008):
Physicians must seek to protect patient privacy in all of its forms, including (1)
physical, which focuses on individuals and their personal spaces, (2)
informational, which involves specific personal data, (3) decisional, which
focuses on personal choices, and (4) associational, which refers to family or
other intimate relations. Such respect for patient privacy is a fundamental
expression of patient autonomy and is a prerequisite to building the trust that
is at the core of the patient-physician relationship.
8 The greatest challenge to the deidentification model is the growing impossibility of
deidentification because of, for example, the unique genetic signature of data, or the exposure of
apparently deidentified data to reidentification because of, for example, geo-coding. See, e.g.,
Gerard Rushton et al., Geocoding in cancer research: a review, 30 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S16, S19-20
(2006) (discussing potential privacy dilemmas in geocoding in relation to cancer research).
9 Questions persist about the level of identifier-stripping necessary to create deidentified data.
For example, data that has been only "anonymized" has not been deidentified.
10 45 C.F.R § 164.514(a) (2009) ("Health information that does not identify an individual and
with respect to which there is no reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to
identify an individual is not individually identifiable health information.").
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legal domain recognizes few collection-centric rules. For example, the Restatement's
black-letter law of "privacy" provides as follows:
The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another ... or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness ... or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life... or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before
the public.' 2
This "right of privacy" promises far more than it delivers. On its face the
Restatement fails to provide any general or comprehensive "right of privacy." It is no
more than a listing of modest protections - nominate and discrete tort actions applicable
in a narrow range of circumstances rather than fact-sensitive applications of a general
principle or theory of privacy. Further, even a cursory examination of this "right of
privacy," as it applies to health providers, suggests that only the protection against
"unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another" is in any way applicable.
This seclusion-based privacy model has seldom been applied to the health
domain and its doctrinal elements limit its applicability to outlying cases. A commonly
cited example of health privacy protection is Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt,13 where a
physician was held to have intruded into a dying cancer patient's "physical or mental
solitude or seclusion" when he took photographs against the patient's wishes. But, even
where the doctrine is generally applicable to a particular circumstance, the doctrine is
quite restrictive. Thus, in Knight v. Penobscot Bay Medical Center,14 a nurse's husband arrived
at a hospital to pick up his wife. To give him something to do while he waited, the
1 In contrast, for example, European law requires that cell phone customers be allowed to
request non-itemized billing and requires providers to make data that it collects regarding a user's
location anonymous. Parliament and Council Directive 2002/58/EC, art. 7, 9, 2002 O.J. (L 201)
37, 41, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2002L0058:20060-
503:EN:PDF (last visited Dec. 13, 2008) (concerning the processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and
electronic communications)).
12 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A(2) (1977).
13 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976).
14 420 A.2d 915 (Me. 1980).
VOL. V NO. 1
JOURNAL OF HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL LAW
husband was gowned and permitted to observe a stranger's labor and delivery. The
plaintiff's cause of action failed because there was no evidence that the husband had
intended the intrusion into the patient's seclusion. Only in extreme cases will privacy, as
understood by the legal system, have an impact on patient health information. For
example, in Swarthout v. Mutual Service Life Insurance,'5 the court held that the doctrine
could apply when a life insurance company altered an applicant's medical information
release, used it to obtain information from other sources, and transmitted the
information to a medical-records database, which was available to other insurers.
In contrast to deidentification and collection, the third protective model,
whereby limitations are placed on data disclosure, is well established in U.S. normative
circles. For example, in the ethical domain, the American Medical Association (AMA)
states that "[t]he physician should not reveal confidential communications or
information without the consent of the patient, unless provided for by law or by the
need to protect the welfare of the individual or the public interest."1 6 Although
frequently described in terms of "privacy" and "privacy law," the legal protections
applied to patient health information by the common law, state statutes, or the federal
standards have very little to do with either. Aside from a few "intrusion upon the
seclusion" actions, the modern law of health privacy resides in the far narrower,
disclosure-centric model doctrinally captured in cases, statutes, and regulations dealing
with breach of confidence. A patient exercises his right of privacy (as recognized by the
ethical domain) when he chooses to provide information to his physician (albeit a
"right" that is illusory if it is a condition of treatment). Thereafter, dissemination of that
inform i hv the nhvsicinn is limited by ethical and legal standards of confidence,17
hereinafter referred to as confidentiality. Today, when courts and regulators speak of
medical "privacy" they are usually in error, mislabeling what are obligations of
"confidentiality."
Long before the promulgation of the federal standards, most states had
developed common law 18 and statutory protections applicable to health information.' 9
15 632 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
16 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS,
FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP para. 4 (1990),
www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja~aa90.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2008)
[hereinafter FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS].
17 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 6, at 410. It may also be limited by express agreement
between the parties.
18 See, e.g., Givens v. Mullikin ex rel. Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383 (Tenn. 2002); Berger v.
Sonneland, 26 P.3d 257 (Wash. 2001); Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ohio
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Languidly, the courts articulated a cause of action for breach of confidence. Decisions
explained the distinction between defendants in privacy and confidence actions-"Only
one who holds information in confidence can be charged with a breach of confidence.
If an act qualifies as a tortious invasion of privacy, it theoretically could be committed by
anyone. ' '20 Further decisions have clarified the differences between the types of data at
issue in privacy and confidence proceedings: "Not every secret concerns personal or
private information; commercial secrets are not personal, and governmental secrets are
neither personal nor private. Secrecy involves intentional concealment. 'But privacy
need not hide; and secrecy hides far more than what is private."' 21
The development of the common law of confidentiality has been
"distinguished" by quite arcane discussions as to the correct doctrinal basis for
protecting patient confidences (including implied contract, breach of a fiduciary
relationship, and even "privacy"). Only in the last decade could it be said that "[s]lowly
and unevenly, through various gradations of evolution, courts ...moved toward the
inevitable realization that an action for breach of confidence should stand in its own
right, and increasingly courts have begun to adopt it as an independent tort in their
respective jurisdictions. '22
Generally, state statutory models have been more successful in reflecting the
realities of modern healthcare delivery and the particular issues posed by informational
privacy. Although still generally limited to a collection-centric approach (and frequently
1999) (assessing liability on doctors for unauthorized disclosure of patient information); Alberts
v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 119 (Mass. 1985) (determining physicians have duty not to disclose
information unless serious danger to patient or others); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or.,
696 P.2d 527, 533 (Or. 1985) (recognizing importance of right of privacy but not applicable to
this case); Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (holding
pharmacists have a fiduciary duty not to disclose confidential health information); Hurvitz v.
Hoefflin, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558, 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (determining unconstitutional to seal
documents); Jeffrey H. v. Imai, Tadlock & Keeney, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(recognizing zone of privacy of California Constitution to extend to one's medical records);
McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 434 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (acknowledging common law
tort action for breach of confidence).
19 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West 2007) (requiring patients' information to remain
confidential); 2001 Haw. Sess. Laws 244; MONT. CODE ANN. §5 50-16-501 to 16-553 (2007)
(recognizing importance of confidentiality in patient information); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
70.02.005 to .02.904 (West 2003) (providing for protection of patient information); WIS. STAT.
146.83 (2001) (discussing release and transfer of patient information).
20 Humphers, 696 P.2d at 530.
21 Id. at 529.
22 Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999).
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mislabeled as going to privacy rather than confidentiality), these statutes have tended to
be more comprehensive and coherent than their common law progenitors. Such
statutes frequently are more explicit in extending the duty of confidence to the myriad of
providers and insurers involved in modern healthcare delivery. For example, by
requiring written authorization for disclosure and making access available to the courts,
law enforcement, and public health entities. 23 These state "privacy" statutes, however,
have not supplanted the common law action for breach of confidence, primarily because
most statutes do not permit a private right of action by patients.24
The federal standards apply to a broad range of "covered entities" 25 including,
for example, health, but not life, insurers. These providers, 26 such as hospitals,
physicians, and health plans, are subject to the regulations if they transmit health
information "in electronic form in connection with a [HIPAA-EDI transaction]. ' '27 The
federal standards place limitations on the disclosure of "protected health information," 28
including information that "relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental
health or condition of an individual" 29 and identifies or could identify the individual. 30
Thereafter, the provider may only disclose private health information (PHI) as permitted
by the federal standards. 31
Unlike the situation at common law, the federal standards do not give patients a
private right of action for unauthorized disclosures. Rather, enforcement of the
disclosure rules is accomplished with a compliance model, detailing the appointment of
a "privacy officer," the incorporation of staff training,32 and the development and
disclosure of "privacy" policies, all, generally, through complex regulatory oversight.33
23 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10 (West 2009).
24 A small number of state statutes do allow such an action. See, e.g. WIS. STAT. § 146.84 (1)(c)
(2001) ("An individual may bring an action to enjoin any violation of § 146.82 or 146.83 or to
compel compliance with § 146.82 or 146.83 and may, in the same action on, seek damages as
provided in this subsection."). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.35 (West 2009) (allowing recovering
of compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorneys' fees when medical information has
been disclosed in violation of law); 2001 Haw. Sess. Laws 244.
25 45 C.F.R. 5 164.502(1) (2009).
26 See 45 C.F.R. 5 160.103 (2009) (defining providers).
27 45 C.F.R. § 160.102(a)(3) (2009). For a discussion of HIPAA-EDI transactions see infra, text
accompanying note 93 et seq.
28 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2009).
29 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2009).
30 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2009).
31 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2009).
32 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.530 (2009).
33 See 45 C.F.R. 5§ 160.300 to .312 (2009).
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For providers, therefore, the federal "privacy" experience owes little to the general
principles of confidentiality recognized in the ethical domain and moves closer to other
"hated" oversight models such as those applying to patient dumping,3 4 reimbursement,
or fraud and abuse.35 This is a theme that I return to below. 36
I1. An Inadequate "Privacy-Confidence" Rationale
In the ethical domain, the most cogent justification for privacy and
confidentiality is the principle of autonomy. For example, Beauchamp and Childress
argue that claims to privacy "are justified by rights of autonomous choice that are
correlative to the obligations expressed in the principle of respect for autonomy."37 As
already noted, in the information domain a patient exercises this autonomy-based right
of privacy when he or she shares information with his or her physician and thereafter
relies on ethical or legal standards of confidentiality to police subsequent disclosure. 38 It
is arguable that today's health confidence laws (particularly the federal standards) do not
reference any underlying autonomy model. Rather, they are based on more limited and
less satisfying instrumental models and, worse, are increasingly justified on utilitarian
constructs (specifically, "rule" Utilitarianism).39
Of course, the autonomy rationale for privacy and confidentiality is not
universally accepted, and the two principles have had their share of consequentialist and
instrumentalist rationales. 40 Even Jay Katz's seminal account of patient autonomy
admits that the "right to privacy - the right to keep one's thoughts and feelings to
oneself' 41 must "bend to psychological autonomy" 42 so as to further autonomy's central
goal of "respectful conversation. '43 Equally, Charles Fried's conception of privacy -
"[tio respect, love, trust, feel affection for others and to regard ourselves as the objects
of love, trust and affection is at he heart of our notion of ourselves as persons among
persons, and privacy is the necessary atmosphere for these attitudes and actions, as
34 See, e.g., Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).
35 See, e.g., Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. 5 1320a-7b(b); Ethics in Patient
Referrals Act (STARK), 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006).
36 See infra text accompanying note 116, et seq. (discussing managing privacy in health information
domain).
37 BEAUCHIAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 6, at 410.
38 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
39 BEAucHAmp & CHILDRESS at 409-10.
40 Id. at 409-24.
41 JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 127 (1984).
42 Id. at 128.
43 Id. at 141-42.
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oxygen is for combustion" 44 - on which he bases a robust critique of instrumental (and
primarily utilitarian) justifications for privacy is itself somewhat instrumentalist when it
argues that "privacy is not just one possible means among others to insure some other
value, but that it is necessarily related to ends and relations of the most fundamental
sort; respect, love, friendship and trust. 4
Instrumental justifications for medical privacy and confidentiality are simply
stated. Thus, patients provide information to physicians in the belief that it will further
their diagnosis and treatment while physicians respect confidences in order to encourage
patients to disclose personal and medical information that will make diagnosis and
treatment more effective. This justification may not be an entirely flawed way of
looking at the physician-patient discourse. However, it is a notion that stumbles outside
of the physician-patient paradigm and becomes unstable when applied in, for example,
institutional or industrial models of care. In such models, the notion falls prey to
modern utilitarian arguments that see the generation, dispersal, and processing of
longitudinal patient health information primarily as a necessity to reduce overall
healthcare costs and to minimize medical error. As the context changes, therefore, the
simple and probably innocuous instrumental approach becomes increasingly utilitarian.
The current tensions in the medical privacy-confidentiality debate are somewhat
reminiscent of familiar debates about the nature of informed consent. As described by
Beauchamp and Childress, there is a vector between two senses of informed consent. In
the first sense, "[an informed consent is an autonomous authorization by individuals of a
medical intervention or of involvement in research."46 In the second sense, consent is
"analyzable in terms of the social rules of consent in the institutions that must obtain legally
valid consent from patients or subjects before proceeding with therapeutic procedures
or research. '47 Consider, in this context, Braddock's view that informed consent
primarily rotates around social rules, specifically legal notions:
[T]he well-known mnemonic PAR reminds the clinician to disclose the
nature of the procedure, alternatives, and risks in any informed consent
discussion. The rationale of this approach either satisfies an adminis-
trative requirement or protects oneself from liability, rather than view-
"Charles Fried, Privag, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS
OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 205 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., Cambridge University Press
1984).
45 Id.
46 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 6, at 143.
47 Id. at 144.
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ing the decision making process as a meaningful path toward fostering
patient involvement. 48
Braddock's observations capture a serious disconnect between the ethical and
(common law and statutory) regulatory approaches to informed consent. Beauchamp
and Childress may argue, "from the moral viewpoint, informed consent has less to do
with the liability of professionals . .. and more to do with the autonomous choices of
patients and subjects. '49  Yet, ethical and legal domains continue to grow apart,
increasing the vector between the autonomy rationale and social rules informed by legal
rules and day-to-day operations. Informed consent law tends to focus on the narrow
issue of "consent" rather than the disclosure of information that increases patient choice
and participation. Only a few jurisdictions have recognized a broader approach, such as
expanding the doctrine's reach to include all treatment risks50 and other information
such as non-medical risks5' risks of non-treatment, 2 and physician impairments.5 3
Today, courts are far more likely to limit the duty to disclose to cases involving surgical
risks.54  In contrast, ethical observations on disclosure55 or "choice"5 6 are far more
48 Clarence H. Braddock, III et al., Informed Decision Making in Outpatient Practice: Time to Get Back to
Basics, 282J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2313, 2313-14 (1999).
49 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 6, at 146.
50 See, e.g., Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 464 (N.J. 1999):
It is not dispositive that the alternative that the physician recommends is more
or less invasive than other alternatives. (citation omitted) The critical
consideration is not the invasiveness of the procedure, but the patient's need
for information to make a reasonable decision about the appropriate course of
medical treatment, whether invasive or noninvasive.
51 See, e.g., Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 599-600 (Cal. 1993) (declining to require mandatory
disclosure of life expectancy in case where physician allegedly failed to discuss the low life
expectancy of a patient suffering from pancreatic cancer).
52 See, e.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 907 (Cal. 1980) (holding that physician had a duty to
provide the decedent with all information material to her decision whether or not to undergo pap
smear diagnostic test). Cf. Vandi v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463, 467 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the duty of disclosure is predicated upon a recommended treatment
or diagnostic procedure and the failure to recommend a procedure must be addressed under
ordinary medical negligence standards).
53 See, e.g., Johnson by Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Wis. 1996) (determining
physician needed to inform patient on his experience, comparative risk statistics, and availability
of other, better centers and physicians).
54 See, e.g., Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 618 (Pa. 1997) (holding that informed consent was
not required in cases involving non-surgical procedures); see also Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d
1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) ("[T]he doctrine of informed consent is not the legal panacea for all
damages arising out of any type of malfeasance by a physician.").
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nuanced yet far truer to the autonomy rationale.
A similar vector can be detected in the medical confidentiality debate. The
common law originally eschewed a rights-based approach, preferring to view breach of
confidence as based on fidelity or implicit agreement. In contrast, the movement
towards tort-based recovery for breach of confidence, an action recognized by a growing
number of jurisdictions,57 is clearly more rights-based and reminiscent of some of the
early autonomy-based informed consent decisions.5 8 Consider the frame established in
one of the more influential common law confidentiality cases:
[I]here is widespread public knowledge of the ethical standards of the
medical profession and widespread belief that confidences made by a
patient to a physician may not be disclosed without the permission of
the patient. Patients .. .have the right to rely on this common under-
standing of the ethical requirements which have been placed on the
medical profession and to obtain damages against a physician if he
violates such confidentiality.5 9
55 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 6, at 145-50.
56 Robert M. Veatch, Abandoning Informed Consent, 25 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 5 (Mar./Apr. 1995)
("Consent may be what can be called a transition concept, one that appears on the scene as an
apparently progressive innovation, but after a period of experience turns out to be only useful as
a tansition to a more thoroughly revisionary conceptual framework.").
57 See, e.g., Berger v. Sonneland, 26 P.3d 257, 259 (Wash. 2001) (describing lawsuit where doctor
discussed confidential information to patient's husband); Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715
N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999) (concerning tort action for hospital's breach of patient's confidential but
non-medical information); Hurvitz v. Hoefflin, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558, 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(determining whether names of third party patients could be disclosed); Jeffrey H. v. Imai,
Tadlock & Keeney, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 918-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (outlining lawsuit for
copying and disclosing confidential information on patient's medical status); McCormick v.
England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 432 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (detailing patient's action against physician for
breaching duty of confidentiality); Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001) (involving class action for purchase and sale of CVS's customers' medical and
prescription information without authorization).
58 See, e.g. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (reversing District Court's directed
verdict for doctor that failed to obtain informed consent from patient); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d
1, 7-12 (Cal. 1972) (setting forth jury instructions on informed consent and a doctor's duty).
59 Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 684 P.2d 581, 587 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), affd in part,
rev'd inpart, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985); see also Duquette v. Maricopa, 778 P.2d 634, 640 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1989) ("[T]he public has a widespread belief that information given to a physician in
confidence will not be disclosed to third parties absent legal compulsion, and we further believe
that the public has a right to have this expectation realized.').
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Outside of such private law constructs federal constitutional protections for
privacy have been relatively slow to develop, 60 although a small number of states have
specific constitutional protections that use rights-based language in the context of
privacy, and some of these constitutional provisions have been applied with rigor in
healthcare cases.61
Congress adopted what was promulgated as the HIPAA-EDI model of health
transactions in order to reduce the "back-end," transactional costs of healthcare delivery.
That mandate was accompanied by powers to promulgate protective standards not
because of a principled commitment to patient privacy or confidentiality but to
minimize objections to and maximize participation in a transactional model desired by
industry and promoted by government.
Instrumental fingerprints are all over the federal standards. As originally
promulgated, the standards required that patients should consent to disclosure for
treatment, payment, or healthcare operations (TPO) purposes.62  Yet, the Bush
administration amended the regulation, removing the requirement for consent 63 and
replaced it with the permissive statement that "[a] covered entity may obtain consent of
the individual to use or disclose protected health information to carry out treatment,
payment, or health care operations." 64 Of course, the original regulation provided little
meaningful protection for patients; for example, the required consent could be general
and the provider could refuse to treat a patient who refuses consent.65 However, the
value of that initial permission was educational and empowering; it offered a symbolic
60 But see Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that research institution violated federal privacy rights of clerical and administrative
workers who were tested for intimate medical conditions without their knowledge as part of an
employee health examination). See also U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 580 (3rd
Cir. 1980) (holding that employee medical records fall within protected zone of privacy); U.S.v.
Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d 609, 610 (W.D. Va. 2001) (holding that government cannot disclose
prescription records without giving patients a chance to object).
61 See, e.g. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10-12 (Fla. 1990) (discussing FLA.
CONST. art. I, para. 23); see also King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 494 (Ga. 2000) (discussing GA.
CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1). But see Rollins v. Ulmer, 15 P.3d 749, 750 (Alaska 2001) (finding that
the registration requirements of Alaska's medical marijuana law were constitutional). See also
Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring The Privacy and Confidenfiality of Electronic Health
Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 681, 710-11 (detailing the U.S. constitution and Supreme Court's
treatment of the right of privacy).
62 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2001), amended by 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2009).
63 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a) (2009).
64 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b)(1) (2009).
65 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(h) (2001), amended by 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b) (2009).
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privacy-confidentiality "moment" that conveyed a "rights" message in much the same
way that the requirement of consent to procedures asserts the precedence of autonomy
over paternalism.
The adoption of an almost exclusively instrumental approach is further
evidenced by the federal government's choice of enforcement models. The federal
standards (in common with the majority of state standards on which they are modeled)66
do not provide an aggrieved patient with enforcement through a private right of action;
rather they provide for a compliance mechanism with regulatory agency oversight and
the potential for civil or criminal penalties. 67  The message is that any privacy-
confidentiality "rights" belong to the healthcare system and not to patients.
The use of instrumental rationales for patient privacy and confidentiality likely
will be increased as systems are introduced to reduce medical error. Process-driven,
technologically enabled healthcare delivery will tend to minimize the role of the
individual autonomous physician (and the correlate autonomous patient), replacing
autonomy and choice with systems that identify and potentially commoditize patients
(e.g., by positively identifying them with bar codes) and reducing discretion in treatment
(e.g., by relying on Clinical Practice Guidelines and Clinical Decision Support Systems).
Such technologies have a huge, potentially deleterious impact on individuals' privacy and
confidentiality. Yet, they are likely to be accompanied by minimalist protections that, as
with the federal standards in HIPAA, will be designed so as not to impede the overall
error-reducing model, for example, by favoring outcomes research to further the greater
good of population-based care.
Just as so many courts have moved informed consent away from autonomy and
back towards a type of quasi-paternalism (limiting its applicability by fact-pattern68 and
using professional custom as its standard),69 so the federal standards have gutted the
66 See supra text accompanying note 24 (pointing out lack of private right of action under state
standards).
67 Of course, some courts will "patch" this omission by back-filling a tort remedy modeled on
statutory breach or informed by breach of the federal standards. See, e.g., U.S. v. Sutherland, 143
F. Supp. 2d 609, 611-12 (W.D. Va. 2001) (comparing state and federal privacy laws); Doe v.
Cmty. Health Plan-Kaiser Corp., 709 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (alleging counts
of negligence for disclosure of information).
68 See supra note 54.
69 See, e.g., Campbell v. Palmer, 568 A.2d 1064, 1067 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (noting standards
physician must follow). This "professional standards" or custom-based approach represents
judicial backsliding from the patient expectations, autonomy-based approach of seminal cases
such as Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See generally Ketchup v. Howard, 543
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nascent rights-based approach to privacy and confidentiality, preferring an instrumental
rationale that is almost totally focused on institutions and compliance.
IV. Distortions of the Physician-Patient Touchstone
When medicine's professional hegemony was at its most dominant in the legal
domain, described by Rand Rosenblatt as a model designed to "support the authority
and autonomy of individual physicians engaged in the practice of medicine," 70 it was
supportive of professional rather than patient autonomy. In more modern times and
even as this core commitment was deconstructed by the courts and ethicists, 71 the
physician-patient relationship has continued to play a dominant role in shaping, but
ultimately distorting, our privacy-confidentiality model.
. As a legal construct, the "physician-patient relationship" was important in the
development of confidentiality-based restraints but ultimately corrosive of any broader
sense of health privacy. First, the physician-patient relationship paradigm has favored
the development of confidentiality rather than privacy models. Second, as the myriad of
new relationships and structures that we collectively think of as industrialized medicine
took hold (and as market theory began to dominate health regulation), 72 the traditional
professional model had been reduced to a primarily operational concept with little or
nothing to protect patient information. As a result and as healthcare delivery
metamorphosed, industrial providers, who faced few ethical or legal constraints, began
to exploit patient information for utilitarian or outright commercial purposes.73 This
negative process can be seen as the product of how the physician-patient relationship
developed in overlapping domains and the increasingly fragmented care offered by
modern delivery systems.
S.E.2d 371, 381-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (appendix providing a summary of different jurisdictions'
approaches to the standard of disclosure).
70 Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155, 162-66 (2004)
(describing the years of 1880 to 1960 as those in which the professional model dominated).
71 See id. at 168-69.
72 See id. at 175-90.
73 The trend continues today. See Nicolas P. Terry, Legal Barriers to Realizng the Public Good in
Clinical Data, in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL DATA AS THE BASIC STAPLE OF HEALTH
LEARNING: CREATING AND PROTECTING A PUBLIC GOOD, Eds. (National Institutes of Health,
forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Public Good in Clinical Data]. See generally text accompanying note
88 (discussing apparent AMA interest in monetizing patient data).
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A. Overlapping Domains and a "Race to the Bottom"
As an ethical construct the physician-patient relationship is neither monolithic
nor singular. Different interpretations or models of the relationship have ranged from
those that emphasize paternalism or friendship to the merely technical ("plumber"),
amongst several metaphors. 74 Notwithstanding, it is the foundation of competence,
respect, and confidence. 75 Thus, the ethical principles provide that, "[t]he patient has
the right to confidentiality. The physician should not reveal confidential
communications or information without the consent of the patient, unless provided for
by law or by the need to protect the welfare of the individual or the public interest." 76
In the legal domain, the "physician-patient relationship" synopsizes the
contractual responsibilities of the parties (such as beginning and end, terms of service
and payment), limits the physician's externalization of patient-incurred treatment or
informational risks,77 and defines and delimits various tort or fiduciary-based legal
prescriptions ("duties").78 The transposition of this professional (or ethical) paradigm
into legal doctrine did much to preserve medicine's professional hegemony. For
example, in the quality domain, it has been used to limit physician duties, impose
internal professional standards (as dispositive of quality questions), and demote the
importance of institutional responsibility.79 Compared to the nuanced explication of the
ethical domain, the legal domain's use of the physician-patient relationship has been far
simpler, essentially contractual in its metaphor, and paternalistic in its policy. Crucially,
given the simple delivery model of the physician-patient relationship, confidence
arguably sufficed and any broader sense of legal protection of medical privacy was
74 See James F. Childress & Mark Siegler, Metaphors and Models of Doctor-Patient Relationships. Their
Implications for Autonomy, 5 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 17, 17-21 (1984) (outlining various
metaphors used in doctor-patient relationship).
75 See, e.g., American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics (2001), http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
76 FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS, supra note 16, at para. 4.
77 See, e.g., Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 667-69 (Pa. 1966) (dealing with issue of consent
during internal procedures where patient is under anesthesia).
78 See, e.g., Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440, 444-59 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)
(determining no duty of care thus no negligence); Kruger v. Jennings, No. 227480, 2002 WL
652098, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2002) (deciding doctor-patient relationship existed).
79 See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Through an E-Health Lens, Darkly: Observations on Law, Industy, and
Innovation in Medicine and Industrj, in CHANGING PARADIGMS IN HEALTH LAW, POLICY AND
ETHICS (George F. Tomossy et al. eds.) (forthcoming); Nicolas P. Terry, A Medical Ghost in the E-
Health Machine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 225, 225-26 (2004) (using e-health as a vehicle to portray this
situation).
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stillborn.
In the operational domain, the physician-patient relationship became
synonymous with a simpler model, an ongoing relationship of care and treatment. This
concept of "continuity of care" did not denote permanence but was founded on more
than, say, the opportunistic prescribing relationship that a patient would have with a
physician prescribing drugs on the Internet.8 0 It was not a sophisticated state; rather, it
identified the parties, denoted access to the patient's history, and highlighted purely
operational requirements such as updating records. Instrumental justifications for med-
ical confidence flourished in this operational domain. As already noted,
"confidentiality" in this domain has tended to rotate around two co-dependent, practical
imperatives: patients disclosing information to physicians to seek protection of their
health and physicians respecting confidences in order to encourage patients to disclose
needed personal and medical information.
In traditional, pre-industrial medicine, these three domains, ethical, legal, and
operational, were essentially synchronized. In context, the parallelism between legal,
ethical, and operational domains was not particularly harmful. The physician-patient
relationship was not forced to deal with competition or conflict between the domains.
But, as a practical matter, patient confidentiality was respected even though the rationale
may have been instrumental and the model somewhat paternalistic. Over time, however,
I believe that physicians, while cognizant and respectful of the ethical domain (albeit not
particularly troubled by nascent legal rules on confidentiality), have primarily viewed
confidentiality as a function or property of the operational domain. There was a slide to
the lowest common denominator as the practical imperatives of the physician-patient
relationship operation overshadowed and ultimately diminished the contributions of the
ethical and legal domains. Consider, by way of example, how the AMA's Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) undercuts its policy on confidentiality-"[t]he
information disclosed to a physician during the course of the relationship between
physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible degree"-with the
instrumental observation that "[t]he patient should feel free to make a full disclosure of
information to the physician in order that the physician may most effectively provide
needed services." 8'
80 See Nicolas P. Terry, Prescriptions sans Frontiires (or How I Stopped Worying about Viagra on the Web
but Grew Concerned about the Future of Healtbcare Deivfy), 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS
183, 188, 251 (2004) [hereinafter Prescriptions sans Frontires] (describing impact Internet has on
doctor-patient relationship).
81 Id.
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By the time that the physician-patient relationship was replaced as the
dominant delivery paradigm, little was left but operationally derived instrumental values.
Legal conceptions of confidence and privacy were limited or underdeveloped, while the
dominant instrumental values were ill prepared for a transition to new models of care.
B. The Ascendancy of Fragmented Care
The reasons cited to explain the decline of the physician-patient relationships
are legion. Over two decades ago James Childress and Mark Siegler explained this
phenomenon as follows:
Numerous causes can be identified: First, the pluralistic nature of our
society; second, the decline of close, intimate contact over time among
professionals and patients and their families; third, the decline of
contact with the "whole person," who is now parceled out to various
specialists; fourth, the growth of large, impersonal, bureaucratically
structured institutions of care, in which there is discontinuity of
care .... 82
To this catalogue we can add the growth of managed care (not to mention its
potential for conflicts of interest and the vertical and horizontal integration it
encouraged), an increase in the use of ambulatory care (which is episodic in nature and
less stable as to its location), and the insertion of "new" players into the medical
industrial complex, such as government rationing care, pharmaceutical companies
seeking direct relationships with patients, and "docs-in-a-box" in retail stores, 3 web
medical advice sites8 4 and online pharmacies85 ignoring traditional channels.
Interestingly, perhaps even ironically, a very similar catalogue (the emergence of
managed care, the rise of ambulatory care, and the horizontal and vertical integration of
providers into delivery systems) today is used to explain the emergence of
82 Childress & Siegler, supra note 74, at 22.
83 See, e.g., Press Release, Wal-Mart, 400 Health Clinics to Open in Wal-Mart Stores During Next
Three Years, Up to 2,000 Could Open Over Next Five to Seven Years, (April 24, 2007),
http://wamartstores.com/FactsNews/NewsRoom/6419.aspx (last visited Dec. 28, 2008)
(announcing opening of health clinics within retail stores).
84 See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Cyber-Maoracfice: Legal Exposure for Cyber-medicine, 25 AM. J.L. &
MED. 327, 349-58 (1999) (discussing different models of medical advice sites and legal
implications).
85 See generally Prescniplions sans Frontires, supra note 80, at 183-84 (outlining policy and legal
implications of Internet prescribing).
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technologically mediated care, particularly Electronic Health Records (EHR) systems. 86
These developments bring with them their own problems, as discussed below.87
Many of these changes, particularly the emergence of "shared care" (denoting
that a patient should share responsibility with his or her provider for care)88 may be
viewed as potentially beneficial and the beginning of a new contracting model of
autonomy between rational actors involved in healthcare. In the interim, however, they
point to a new healthcare delivery paradigm with primarily negative short-term
implications-fragmented care delivered in a medico-industrial setting.
Ethicists have long recognized the deterioration of the traditional physician-
patient relationship, and its regrettable shift from a relationship of intimates to
encounters between strangers. As Childress and Siegler noted:
Whether medicine is now only a series of encounters between strangers
rather than intimates, medicine is increasingly regarded by patients and
doctors, and by analysts of the profession-such as philosophers, law-
yers, and sociologists-as a practice that is best understood and regu-
lated as if it were a practice among strangers rather than among
intimates. 89
A concept of privacy-confidentiality protection that is bound to an outdated
conception of the confidence inherent in a single physician-patient relationship was
bound to fail when the physician-patient relationship was replaced by fragmented care.
Domain synchronization evaporated, and it is unlikely that patients comprehended the
extent of their "agreement" to disclose given the institutional settings within which their
86 See, e.g., Paul C. Tang & W. Ed Hammond, A Progress Report on Computer-based Paient Records in
the United States, in THE COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD: AN ESSENTIAL TECHNOLOGY FOR
HEALTH CARE 1 (D.E. Detmer et al. eds., rev. ed. 1997); Tracy D. Gunter & Nicolas P. Terry,
The Emergence of National Electronic Health Record Architectures in the United States and Australia: Models,
Costs, and Questions, 7 J. MED. INTERNET.RES. e3 (2005), http://www.jmir.org/2005/1/e3
(providing description of EHR, different EHR models, and practical and legal challenges of
EHR).
87 See infra text accompanying note 93, et seq. (explaining technology creates issues that ethic and
legal constructs have failed to discuss).
88 See, e.g. Peter Briss et al., Promoting Infomed Decisions About Cancer Screening in Communities and
Healthcare Systems, 26 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 67, 67 (2004) (defining shared decision making,
noting its importance, but realizing that it alone is not enough to elicit informed decision
making).
89 Childress & Siegler, supra note 74, at 22.
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information was destined to circulate. 90 Equally, patients are unlikely to understand the
level of information processing, such as commercial aggregation,91 that such settings
employ or facilitate. At a time of uncertainty (and, specifically, informational
asymmetry), it was hopeful that the legal domain would operate as a corrective, by
supplying "rights." As already noted, however, the legal domain failed to develop
meaningful privacy protections and a rights-based approach to breach of confidence was
slow to develop.92 Breach of confidence was far slower to develop, for example, than
informed consent, its autonomy-based fellow traveler. This legal vacuum created the
opportunity for the federal standards. Unfortunately, this opportunity came in an
atmosphere that by now stressed operational (and hence instrumental) goals rather than
the broad principles reflected in ethical or legal rights-based approaches.
V. Healthcare Information: Another Domain Unfolds
It is too early to assess the final impact of the ongoing healthcare technology
revolution but, inevitably, aspects of the delivery system will be fundamentally changed.
Two key sets of technologies are at issue here. The first can be viewed as disruptive-
technologies that replace traditional methods of delivery. These include web-based
medical content, online consultations, and Intemet-prescribing. The second is more
integrative-the leveraging of information technologies (IT) by traditional healthcare
providers to improve the quality of care and reduce its cost structure. Both sets bring
with them difficult privacy issues. Thus, disruptive technologies, in large part because of
their novelty, tend to create issues that our ethical and legal constructs have generally
failed to address. 93 For example, non-traditional providers, such as those engaged in
Internet advice or prescribing generally are not covered by disclosure-centric
confidentiality regulation.94
90 BEAucHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 6, at 419-20.
91 See, e.g.,, Regina v. Dep't of Health, [2001] Q.B. 424, 425-27 (information aggregator seeking to
collect information about physician prescribing habits and sell data to pharmaceutical companies
challenged U.K. policy prohibiting same); see also In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 263, 265
(D. Mass. 2003) (class action against information aggregator and pharmaceutical companies,
alleging that they intercepted and accessed Plaintiffs' personal information through the use of
computer "cookies" and other devices, in violation of state and federal law).
92 See supra note 20, et seq.
93 See generally Prescriptions sans Frontires, supra note 80 (delineating various issues that arise with
Internet prescribing and dispensing).
94 See generally id at 244 (comparing traditional and non-traditional providers coverage under the
disclosure-centric confidentiality regulation).
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A. Healthcare Technologies
The second cluster of technologies particularly highlights privacy and
confidentiality issues as traditional providers increasingly adopt IT models. In pre-
industrial, pre-IT medicine, patient-specific health data was proprietary and non-
integrated. Physicians owned their patients' data (both health and billing information)95
and as a result, data collection models were inconsistent, the data itself was incomplete,
and storage was fragmented across the information silos of multiple providers. In
contrast, information technologies are built on the premise that processes are improved
(both as to outcomes and process efficiencies) by maximizing the collection of
information, consolidating or linking information silos (creating longitudinal patient
data), and making the information available to multiple users in comparable form and
through common and consistent interfaces. U.S. healthcare is in the throes of a
fundamental transition to IT-dominated models for healthcare transactions, risk-
management, and record keeping.
As already noted, HIPAA's "Administrative Simplification" seeks to improve
"the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system, by encouraging the
development of a health information system through the establishment of standards and
requirements for the electronic transmission of certain health information." To reduce
"back-end" costs associated with billing, reimbursement, eligibility inquiries, insurance
claims, and prescription fulfillment,96 HIPAA adopted the e-commerce model of
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)-the electronic exchange of standardized business
documents (or messages) between "trading partners." The HIPAA-EDI requires
healthcare-specific data standards: 97 unique identifiers for health-care providers, health
plans, employers, and patients;98 specific message formats for healthcare transactions
95 See, e.g., Breen v. Williams (1996) 186 C.L.R 71, 80 (Austl.) ("Documents prepared by a
professional person to assist the professional to perform his or her professional duties are not the
property of the lay client; they remain the property of the professional.").
96 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-91, 5 261,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (detailing purpose of legislation); see also S.C. Med. Ass'n v. Thompson, 327
F.3d 346, 348 (4th Cir. 2003) ("HIPAA's Administrative Simplification provisions . . .were
designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system by facilitating the
exchange of information with respect to financial and administrative transactions carried out by
health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who transmit information in
connection with such transactions.').
97 See generally Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Administrative
Simplification in the Health Care Industry, http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/index.shtml (last
visited Dec. 13, 2008) (providing links to various standards).
98 See generaly Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, HIPAA General Information-
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such as enrollment, eligibility, payment and remittance advice, claims, health plan
premium payments, health claim status, and referral certification and authorization; 99
transaction codes (for example, benefit denial or additional information requested) that
are used within the messages; and common formats for healthcare claims attachments
(such as excerpts from medical records) and information about diagnoses and treatment.
The publication of major national studies of medical error rates' 00 has led to
broad calls for amelioratory systems or process redesign of healthcare delivery.'0' The
resultant, and now rapid, massive infusion of technology into healthcare is a key
component in process-based reform. 0 2 This IT-led system reform is centered on
several intersecting technologies. "Tracking" or identifying technologies such as
barcodes and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) positively identify drugs, dosages,
and patients. 10 3 "Entry" technologies consist of computerized physician order entry
(CPOE) systems that seek to avoid medication errors caused by illegibility and other
recording mistakes. 104 Clinical Decision Support Systems (CDSS)05 are evolved order
entry systems that have lost their passivity and reference drug interaction information,
EHR data, or treatment models (such as clinical practice guidelines), and which offer
Overview, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaaGenlnfo/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2008) (providing
information on standards created as require by HIPPA).
99 See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Transaction and Code Sets Standards-
Overview, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/TransactionCodeSetsStands/ (last accessed Dec. 13, 2008)
(providing links for standards on transactions).
100 COMMITrEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, IOM, To ERR IS HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et a!. eds, 1999); Chunliu Zhan & Mariene
R. Miller, Excess Length of Stay, Charges, and Mortaliy Attributable to Medical Injuries during
Hospita'zation, 290 JAMA 1868 (2003).
101 See generaly Lucian L. Leape, Preventing MedicalAcddents: Is "Systems Analysis" the Answer?, 27 AM.
J.L. & MED. 145, 145-48 (2001) (discussing reasons and impact of the report To Err is Human);
James Reason, Human Error: Models and Management, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 768, 768f (2000)
(differentiating between person and system approach in human error and implications differences
have in overall human error problem).
102 COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, IOM, CROSSING THE QUALITY
CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 15 (2001) (describing potential Internet
has for health care).
103 Seegeneral y 21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 606, 610 (2004) (addressing new rule on bar codes).
10 See PETER KILBRIDGE, E-PRESCRIBING 11 (2001), available at http://www.chcf.org/
documents/hospitals/EPrescribing.pdf (last accessed Dec. 13, 2008) (noting example of how
General Motors is working to reduce recording mistakes).
105 See generall Rainu Kaushal & David W. Bates, Computerized Physiaan Order Entr (CPOE) with
Clinical Decision Support Systems (CDSSs), in MAKING HEALTH CARE SAFER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF PATIENT SAFETY PRACtiCES 59 (2001), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/ptsafety/pdf/
ptsafety.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2001) (describing and promoting CPOEs).
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considerable advantages over simple CPOE systems. 0 6 "Reporting" systems provide for
adverse event and medical error disclosure and reporting,10 7 and facilitate population-
based healthcare models and outcomes research.10 8
President Clinton's HIPAA-EDI may have been the first major federal e-health
initiative with serious implications for medical information privacy and confidentiality,
but it was not the last. President George W. Bush's administration took its own first
steps into e-health by authorizing DHHS to develop e-prescribing standards under the
Medicare ModerniZation Act of 2003,109 in part to offset the costs of the Part D prescription
drug benefit. Even today some components of the transactional and e-prescribing
systems continue to struggle towards full implementation.' 0
On April 26, 2004, President Bush announced his goal of assuring that most
Americans will have electronic health records within the next ten years."' To this end,
the President appointed a National Health Information Technology Coordinator to
guide the "nationwide implementation of interoperable health information
106 See, e.g., Anne Bobb et al., The Epidemiology of Prescribing Errors: The Potential Impact of Computerized
Prescriber Order Entry, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 785 (2004) (noting the desirability of
matching CPOE systems to decision support and pharmacy systems to reduce medication
errors). See Bernard Fernando et al., Prescribing Safety Features of General Practice Computer Systems:
Evaluation Using Simulated Test Cases, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 1171, 1171 (2004) (studying four main
computer systems in United Kingdom).
107 See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL FOR SAFETY AND QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE, OPEN DIS-
CLOSURE: A NATIONAL STANDARD FOR OPEN COMMUNICATION IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
HOSPITALS FOLLOWING AN ADVERSE EVENT IN HEALTH CARE (luly 2003), available at
http://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/internet/safety/pubfishing.nsf/Content/F22384CCE74A9F
01CA257483000D845E/$File/OpenDisclosureweb.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2008).
108 See generally Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Outcomes & Effectiveness,
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/outcomix.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2008).
109 Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
110 See, e.g., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDANCE ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HIPAA NATIONAL PROVIDER
IDENTIFIER (NPI) RULE AFTER THE MAY 23, 2007, IMPLEMENTATION DEADLINE,
www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalProvldentStand/Downloads/NPIContingency.pdf (last visited Dec.
13, 2008) (providing for "good faith" relaxed enforcement of sanctions for non-compliance with
National Provider Identifier deadline); Joy M. Grossman et al., Physicians' Experiences Using
Commercial E-Prescribing Systems, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Apr. 3, 2007, http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/content/fill/26/3/w393.
111 Bush Proposes Update of Medical Records, Fox NEWS, Apr. 27, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,118330,00.html.
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technology." ' 1 2 The EHR is a database record that incorporates a patient's healthcare
details from conception to death (i.e., it is longitudinal) and can be distributed over a
number of sites or aggregated at a particular source." 3 It is a core technology promoted
by the patient-safety movement in large part because it will provide much-needed
cohesion for decision-support systems, error reporting, and outcomes research. 14
B. Managing Privacy in the Health Information Domain
In pre-IT times and consistent with an operational paradigm of fragmented
record-keeping, the legal protection of patient data was achieved principally through a
physician-patient relationship disclosure-centric rule, expressed as breach of confidence
and operationalized through implied contract or torts doctrine. Even given the relative
weakness of the disclosure-centric confidentiality model or assuming its occasional
breach, patient "privacy" was somewhat protected by the sheer inefficiencies of a system
built around unstructured, distributed patient data.
This paradigm has now been overwhelmed by the realities of the modern health
information domain. The patient data contained in modern longitudinal systems is
comprehensive, portable, and manipulatable. The potential for abuse is immense; there
are many parties (pharmaceutical companies and government being the obvious
examples, inquisitive healthcare employees being the most commonly reported"15) that
crave access to this data. As a result, the privacy and confidentiality costs potentially
incurred by patients rise exponentially." 6
The emerging health information domain has several key properties that extend
beyond the confidentiality inherent in the physician-patient relationship." 7 In addition
to the confidentiality-privacy-anonymity triumvirate that protects (or should protect)
the basic input and output of patient data, the contemporary health information domain
has (or should possess) several additional properties (or qualities). These protective
rules give rise to "process" controls such as "security" (a confidentiality correlate that
112 Exec. Order No. 13,335, 69 Fed. Reg. 24059 (April 27, 2004).
113 Nicolas P. Terry, Electronic Health Records: International, Structural, and Legal Perectives, 12 J.L. &
MED. (AU) 26 (2004) [hereinafter Structural and LegalPerspectives].
114 Id. See also Nicolas P. Terry, To HIPAA, A Son: Assessing the Technical, Conceptual, and Legal
Frameworks for Patient Safet Information, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 134 (2006).
115 See, e.g., Andrew Blankstein, Digging into celebriy medical records has a long history, L.A. TIMEs, May
19, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/19/local/me-tabs20.
116 Seegeneraly Terry & Francis, supra note 61.
117 See generalyl Health Information Domain, supra note 5.
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restricts access to data to those authorized to receive it) and "integrity" (data
"checksum" validation and protection against unauthorized modification). As data is
aggregated, additional properties such as "unity," "quality," and "accountability" become
paramount because information domains lose their value proposition when they are
incomplete or their data is otherwise flawed. "Unity" refers to health information that is
"longitudinal," consisting of records from various providers that are consolidated or
interlinked to provide a comprehensive view of a patient's healthcare encounters. A
longitudinal approach provides the data necessary to interface with other technologies
(such as CDSS) that analyze diagnoses and treatments and support shared care from
multiple providers. "Quality" denotes that the data must be current or timely and
subject to quality auditing from extrinsic sources such as clinical practice guidelines.
Finally, the "accountability" property denotes not only substantive responsibility by
providers for the accuracy of the data they enter but also procedural identification of
providers responsible for specific data.
The modern health information domain must also take into account and
integrate the increasing demands for access to the data it contains. Thus, the "access"
property describes the various recognized claims to view and, in some cases, modify
patient information. Justice and public health systems make the most persistent claims.
However, most mature health information domains also recognize patients' rights of
access and correction of their own data. Outcomes assessment and error-reporting
mandates will substantially increase demands for access to individual and population-
based health records from accreditation bodies and government regulators."18
What the discussions of privacy and confidentiality in the context of transaction
standards, error reduction, and electronic health records have in common is a heavily
instrumental approach to health information. This is because the IT revolution that has
brought about the health information domain has less to do with improving or
increasing patient access to services and more with business imperatives. Such
imperatives include reducing healthcare transaction costs (the expenses associated with
medical errors), the inefficiencies associated with multiple providers, and changing roles
of physicians in a managed care environment." 9 As a result, individual autonomy tends
to be viewed as subordinate to broader goals (e.g., lower costs and a reduction in
medical errors) that may or may not directly benefit the individual involved.
When it came time (during the HIPAA debate) to force providers to internalize
118 See generaly Public Good in Clinical Data, supra note 73.
119 See generally Terry, supra note 79.
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some of the privacy risks associated with new technologies, it was perhaps inevitable
that federal architects would eschew traditional "rights" approaches and strike a new
direction. After all, and as already discussed, 120 the physician-patient relationship model
of privacy-confidentiality protection had become operational rather than principled, and
the common law models were unsophisticated and underdeveloped. There is every indi-
cation that any new privacy protections that are clustered around the emerging EHR
model will adopt a similar style and correspondingly lower the level of protection.
Indeed, one of the four cornerstones of the national EHR initiative identified
by Dr. David Brailer, President Bush's first National Coordinator was to address
"variations in privacy and security policies that can hinder interoperability.' 1 21 As noted
elsewhere 122 the national EHR "insiders" viewed this as a mandate to replace the
HIPAA "floor," whereby more stringent state privacy protections are not preempted, 123
with something more akin to a HIPAA "ceiling," tipping the balance away from patient
PCS protections in order to facilitate the national EHR.
It does not have to be this way. For example, the Australian EHR experiment,
known as HealthConnect, 124 eschewed utilitarianism for models clearly based on a
"contracting" autonomy model. HealthConnect, before its effective demise by 2006125
was a "push" system, selectively sending data to a centralized record, and the patient
controls which elements of the centralized record may be used for what purposes or
displayed in which "views. ' 126 The Australian model did not create a comprehensive
longitudinal record. Rather, patients, with their providers, choose which elements may
be extracted from an existing health record and transferred to their separate but
centralized HealthConnect record.
120 See supra note 74, et seq.
121 Activities of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology: Testimony before the
S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcomm. on Technology, Innovation, and Competitiveness,
109th Cong. (2005) (statement of David J. Brailer, M.D., Ph.D., National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) http://www.hhs.
gov/asl/testify/t050630a.html [hereinafter Brailer Testimony].
122 Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records. Directing More Costs and Risks to Consumers? DREXEL U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). See supra text accompanying notes 161-164.
123 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2009).
124 See HealthConnect archive, http://www.health.gov.au/internet/hconnect/publishing.nsf/
Content/home (last visited Jan, 26, 2009).
125 See Department of Health and Ageing, Health Connect, http://www.health.gov.au/internet
/main/publishing.nsf/Content/EHeath+Healthconnect (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
126 See generally Structural and Legal Perspectives, supra note 113, at 32.
2009
JOURNAL OF HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL LAW
In contrast, what is striking about the administrative standards and compliance
mechanisms of the U.S. federal standards is the relatively low level of patient protection
they contain; the complex regulations read more like a catalogue of exceptions than of
rights.
VI. Professional Hegemony, Compliance, and Distrust
In the last few decades, healthcare's legal domain has experienced its most
fundamental revolution; a change from profession-dominated medical boards and ex
post facto torts regulation (based on professional standards) to regulatory systems that
not only are frequently federal rather than state but also use a "command-control"
approach. This regulation began as a way of pushing the health system during what
Rand Rosenblatt has labeled the "egalitarian social contract" model of health law 127 and,
thereafter, as a method of reducing market distortions in the same author's "market
competition" model. 28  It represents a fundamental shift from hegemony to
compliance-based legal regulation. Once confidentiality, courtesy of the federal
standards, joined the regulatory matrix, it became a target for those who criticize the
level and style of governmental regulation of healthcare.
A. Unsupportive Regulation
Mark Hall has provided one modern theoretical context for this battle over
privacy and confidentiality. In an influential article, Hall has argued that "trust" can be
an organizing principle (or at least a dominant theme) for health law.' 29 He premises
this "centrality" of trust on both instrumental ("Trust is the core, defining characteristic
of the doctor-patient relationship - the 'glue' that holds the relationship together and
makes it possible") 130 and therapeutic (both empirical and jurisprudential) grounds.' 3'
Hall regards "trust" in healthcare as the Mary Tyler Moore Show viewed love in
Minneapolis. Thus, "[trust] is all around, no need to waste it"132 is the foundation for
his contractarian attack on healthcare regulation.133  Hall categorizes health law
127 Rosenblatt, supra note 70, at 166-75.
128 Id. at 175-90.
129 Mark A. Hall, Law, Medidne, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463, 464-66 (2002).
130 Id. at 470.
131 Id. at 479-82.
132 SONNY CURTIS, LOVE IS ALL AROUND (Theme song to Magy Tyler Show 1970).
133 Accord M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Markeplace, 55 STAN. L. REv. 919,
922-26 (2002).
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principles as predicated on, supportive of, or skeptical of trust. 3 4 In this matrix, Hall
views confidentiality laws as attempts to support trust and argues they are unnecessary
because of the existence of trust or because they frustrate the role of trust in promoting
market approaches to securing the appropriate level of confidentiality and privacy. 135
Further, he views both the traditional common law of confidence and the federal
standards as "explicitly premised on the therapeutic need to reassure patients that they
can trust their physicians with sensitive, embarrassing, or even incriminating
information, rather than on inherent rights arising from the mere expectation of
privacy."' 36
As follows from the discussion above, Hall's description of modern health
privacy-confidentiality law is partially correct; it is based on instrumental values rather
than, say, autonomy.137 However, that does not amount to an approval of such a
theoretical basis. Further, the instrumental values displayed by the federal standards are
not, as Hall states, "therapeutic" but far more utilitarian in character.138 Greg Bloche
meets Hall's approach head-on:
A large body of scholarship and case law treats privacy as a right,
important for personal dignity and psychological welfare. The law's
protection for medical privacy follows from this more general right.
Yet Hall disregards both the existence of this right and its grounding in
the law's concern for citizens' dignity and mental well-being .... [A]ll
that matters for Hall in evaluating the need for these (and other) legal
protections for medical privacy is whether these safeguards do in fact
promote trust. The actual protection these safeguards provide for
citizens' privacy interests does not count within Hall's evaluative
framework, since these interests, in themselves, are not part of his
framework.139
Bloche's painting of Hall as a cardboard contractarian is tempting because of
the latter's "over-selling" of "trust"; his trust hypothesis is just that, and he fails to
provide convincing evidence or arguments that "trust" is more important, illuminating,
or unifying than traditional ethical and legal underpinnings such as autonomy, rights-
134 Hall, supra note 129, at 486.
135 Id. at 504-6.
136 Id. at 499.
137 See supra note 40.
138 See supra note 44, et seq.
139 Bloche, supra note 133, at 940.
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analysis, or social contract theories. Yet, "trust" is appealing. It is common to most of
the positive metaphors that are used to explicate the physician-patient relationship (such
as friendship and negotiation) and so is worthy of Hall's "glue" appellation. It is also a
comforting aspiration, something that combines therapeutic soundness with the
potential to rehabilitate some of the more corrosive states of the healthcare delivery
system.
"Trust," however, is not a current state, and Hall's empirical evidence 140 may be
premature because there is good reason to suspect growing patient distrust of healthcare
providers. For example, a 2004 poll found that the reputations of pharmaceutical and
health insurance companies continue to slide precipitously.' 41 When asked specifically
about the extent of their trust for healthcare providers, fifty-nine percent of Americans
replied that they distrusted health insurers and forty-one percent distrusted
pharmaceutical companies. While physicians and nurses fared better, some forty percent
of those polled did not trust them "a lot."'1 42 Furthermore, patient concerns about the
security and privacy of their health information continue to be significant in surveys
measuring patient satisfaction in technologically mediated care. 143 Finally, his approach
is fundamentally flawed in treating contemporary issues of health information privacy
today as essentially similar to those in pre-IT healthcare. To the contrary, and as noted
by architects of the United Kingdom's new health information system,
[T]rust relating to the use of data needs to be earned. In practice this
means health professionals need to understand current anxieties about
the ways in which health information is handled; they need to learn the
rules and apply them and accept that unfettered access to personal
health information is a thing of the past and that, among the many
140 Hall, supra note 129, at 473.
141 Harris Interactive, Reputations of Pharmaceutical and Health Insurance Companies Continue Their
Downward Slide, 4(11) HEALTHCARE NEWS 1, June 22, 2004, at 1, available at http://
www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/healthnews/HlHealthCareNews2004Vol4_Issl 1.
pdf. The same poll found the reputation of hospitals also declining but that they are generally
well regarded, albeit ranked behind, for example, software companies and airlines.
142 Harris Interactive, Health-Care Professionals, Pharmacies, Hospitals Gain the Public's Top Trust, 3(2)
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE/HARRIS INTERACTIVE HEALTH-CARE POLL 1, Jan. 28,
2004, at 1, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/wsjhealthnews/WSJOnline
HIHealth-CarePoll2004vol3_iss02.pdf.
143 See, e.g., Christopher N. Sciamanna et al., Patient Altitudes toward Using Computers to Improve Health
Services Delivery, 2(1) BMC HEALTH SERv. RES.19 (2002); Andrea Hassol et al., Patient Experiences
and Attitudes about Access to a Patient Electronic Healthcare Record and Linked Web Messaging, 11(6) J.
AM. MED. INFORMiATICs Assoc. 505 (2004).
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tools they need for modern clinical practice are those of skilled infor-
mation management. 144
Patients, physicians, and regulators alike are nervous and skeptical about the
new demands placed on health information. Unfortunate and debilitating of the
therapeutic relationship it may be, but today, it is distrust that is all around.
B. Limitations and Gaps
Hall classifies the federal standards within his matrix as attempts to be
"supportive" of trust. More extreme anti-regulatory contractarians might view those
same standards as attracting Hall's more damning categorization of a type of health law,
as "skeptical of trust."' 145 Market proponents should be able to argue that such
information regulation imposes immense costs whose benefits have not been bargained
for and distort healthcare markets by impeding provider-provider arrangements.
Indeed, twenty years ago Richard Posner criticized "economically perverse legislative
responses to privacy issues,"' 46 arguing against a "trend toward elevating personal and
downgrading organizational privacy."'1 47
The transition to HIPAA-EDI and the federal standards has not been easy.
Implementation woes continue, as a result of missing or delayed claims, non-
standardized transactions, multiple party processing, and unsuccessful massaging by
clearinghouses. 48 The AMA has even set up an online system to facilitate complaints. 149
Regarding privacy, there are frequent reports that the federal standards are impeding the
delivery of healthcare, 50 and the United States Department of Health & Human
Services (HHS) is continually updating its web site to answer detailed questions about
144 Jim Chalmers & Rod Muir, Patient Privay and Confidentiality, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 725 (2003)
(discussing NHS Information Authority initiatives).
14" Hall, supra note 129, at 512-24.
146 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Tbeogy of Privagy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY:
AN ANTHOLOGY 333, 344 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1984).
147 Id. at 343.
148 Joel B. Finkelstein, HIPAA's Promise Undermined by Claims-Processing Tangle, AMNEWS, Sept. 13,
2004, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/09/1 3/gvsaO9l3.htm.
149 HIPAA Complaint Form, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/
11132.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
150 See, e.g., Ondria C. Gleason & William R. Yates, Suicide Attempt Due to a Misunderstood HIPAA
Notice, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 374 (2004) (noting misinterpretation of privacy notice from
insurer as notice of non-coverage, possibly contributing to suicide attempt).
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the applicability of the privacy standards.' 5' Even avid supporters of the federal
standards would find it difficult to disagree with the scathing comments of Senator Larry
Craig that "as is often the case with federal rulemaking, a kernel of congressional intent
has grown into a towering tree of regulatory complexity. But even by federal
bureaucratic standards, HIPAA is extraordinary.' 5 2 • Not surprisingly, some healthcare
providers, although avowing support for patient confidentiality, have challenged the
validity of the federal standards 153 with no more success than the medical privacy
advocates who challenged the Bush administration amendments. 5 4
In fact, there are some very real criticisms that should be aimed at the federal
standards-not criticisms of regulatory inappropriateness but, rather, under-regulation
and a level of complexity that diminish the educative value of the standards. The
catalogue of HIPAA privacy blunders is large and that which follows is not an
exhaustive list. First, the privacy architecture seems backwards; it concentrates almost
exclusively on the process of patient consent to disclosure. A privacy regime should be
more substantively concerned with limiting the collection and dissemination of personal
health information. Only at the margins should questions of patient consent to
disclosure need to be addressed. Further, as already detailed, the Bush administration
removed an already weak consent-to-disclosure provision, thus, denying a privacy-
autonomy "moment" at the commencement of the provider-patient relationship.155
Second, although HIPAA confidentiality is premised on national standards, limitations
in the enabling legislation prevented the inclusion of patient protective features extant in
some state laws. Unwilling to detract from existing privacy protections, the drafters
constructed a confusing and operationally obstructive "more stringent" partial
preemption rule.' 56 The result is that simply establishing the applicable standard of
health privacy protection in a particular state requires complex (and ongoing) analysis.
151 U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., Health Information Privacy, http://www.hhs.gov/
ocr/hipaa (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
152 HIPAA Medical Privag and Transactions Rules: Overkill or Overdue? Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. on
Aging, 108th Cong. 256 (2003) (statement of Senator Larry Craig), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/l08hrg/91119.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
153 See, e.g., S.C. Med. Ass'n v. Thompson, 327 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 981
(2003) (physicians and medical association challenged federal privacy rule for vagueness and
impermissible delegation). See also Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgs., Inc. v. United States Dep't
of Health and Human Serv., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
154 See, e.g., Citizens for Health v. Thompson, No. 03-2267, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5745 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 2, 2004) (court denied challenge to Bush administration amendment to the privacy rule,
holding that the Secretary had examined the evidence and provided a reasoned analysis).
155 See supra note 62, et seq.
156 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2009).
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Third, and true to their instrumental rationale, the federal standards apply broad
exceptions (public health, judicial, and regulatory) where patient consent to data pro-
cessing is not required 5 7 Fourth, the privacy standards are still too lax regarding
secondary uses of patient information. There are still many unrestricted uses of patient
information outside of treatment and billing; in too many situations patient consent for
secondary uses is not required 18 and in other situations, consideration should have been
given to prohibiting some consented-to secondary uses (e.g., the sale of patient data for
pharmaceutical marketing).
Above all, the standards lack transparency and clarity. They may be labeled as
promotional of "privacy" (in fact mislabeled because they deal only in confidentiality)
but their sheer weight and obliqueness detracts from any educative or principled
"message." With all the amendments, the combined privacy and security standards now
consist of fifty-five pages of dense regulatory language. 5 9 By way of contrast, the
Australian Health Privacy Principles, which provide far more protection of health
information using both collection-centric and disclosure-centric models, take up a mere
six pages of text.160 What was required of the federal standards was a more generalized
statement of principle based clearly on an autonomy-focused rationale; a legal guarantee
that patients have control of their health information. Exceptions should have been far
more narrowly constructed and tightly controlled by concepts of proportionality and
relevance to medical and billing services.
The health insurance crises of the last three decades likely fueled the decision to
omit a private right of action for breach of the federal standards. But, clearly stated
rights and duties have an important educational value that is not captured by pro forma
privacy notices, while caps on recovery (or other limitations) would have been a better
tool to minimize litigation risks. A far better model would have been to appoint an
independent, statutorily authorized patient privacy advocate, such as the Australian
Federal Privacy Commissioner,'6' Ontario's Information & Privacy Commissioner, 162 or
157 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2009).
158 Seegeneraly 45 C.F.R. 5§ 164.505, 164.508, 164.510 (2009).
159 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, COM-
PLETE PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND ENFORCEMENT (PROCEDURAL) REGULATION TEXT (45 CFR
PARTS 160 AND 164) (Aug. 2003).
160 OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, PRIVATE SECTOR INFORMATION SHEET 1A -
NATIONAL PRIVACY PRINCIPLES, http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/nppsOl.pdf (last
visited Jan. 28, 2009).
161 Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, Privacy Complaints, http://wwv.privacy.
gov.au/privacy.rights/complaints/index.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
162 Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, http://www.ipc.on.ca (last visited Jan. 28,
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the United Kingdom's Information Commissioner, 163 who could investigate consumer
complaints, attempt to mediate disputes, and where necessary apply sanctions.
VII. Conclusion
Of course there are more problems with health privacy than detailed in this
essay. As I have argued elsewhere, aggressive plaintiffs' lawyers likely will now add
common law or per se styled breach of privacy allegations in medical error cases, just as
duty to warn counts now routinely turn up in products liability actions and as informed
consent counts are used to buttress lackluster surgical or medication error cases. Also, it
is likely that plaintiffs will use any knowledge they have of provider non-compliance
with the federal regulations-along with all of the penalty ramifications that brings-as
leverage to negotiate a settlement in tangentially related malpractice cases.164
Admittedly, my litany of complaints about the state of health privacy and
healthcare delivery is not entirely consistent. For example, I bemoan the decline of the
physician-patient relationship because of its negative impact on the development of
privacy, yet I welcome the breakdown of professional hegemony. While this essay may
paint a dire picture of technologically mediated care impacting patient information, here
and elsewhere I have been an advocate for technological models.
The goal here, however, is modest. To combine the normative and descriptive
aspects of this essay's ambiguous title, if there's nothing wrong with health privacy why
isn't it what it seems, why aren't its foundation stronger, why is it likely to get worse
before it gets better, and why can't we explain the goals and basic principles of modern
health privacy law to patients and providers in just a few sentences? The answers to
those questions suggest to me that health privacy lies in a fragile state.
2009).
163 Information Commissioner's Office, http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk (last
visited Jan. 28, 2009).
164 Nicolas P. Terry, An eHealth Dipych: The Impact of Ptivagy Regulation on Medical Error and
Maoractice Ldtigation, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 385 (2001).
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